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9 
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON:  
THE NEXT TEN YEARS 
Jeffrey L. Fisher* 
Introduction 
Imagine a world . . . in which the Supreme Court got it right the first 
time. That is, imagine that when the Supreme Court first incorporated the 
Confrontation Clause against the states, the Court did so by way of the 
testimonial approach. 
It’s not that hard to envision. In Douglas v. Alabama—issued in 1965, on 
the same day the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause applies to the 
states—the Court held that a nontestifying witness’s custodial confession 
could not be introduced against the defendant because, while “not 
technically testimony,” the confession was “the equivalent in the jury’s mind 
of testimony” from the nontestifying witness.1 From that platform, all the 
Court would have needed to say in Dutton v. Evans2 and Ohio v. Roberts3 
was that a statement made seemingly in confidence to a cellmate is not 
“testimonial” in nature, while statements at a preliminary hearing obviously 
are (although such statements still are admissible when the defendant had an 
adequate prior opportunity for cross-examination). 
Of course, things did not turn out that way. Concerned about the 
unusual nature of Georgia’s version of the coconspirator hearsay exception 
at issue in Dutton, the Court tied itself up in knots. Then it announced in 
Roberts that the Confrontation Clause essentially tracked hearsay law. 
For the next twenty-four years, states enjoyed a license to operate, for 
the most part, free and clear of the Confrontation Clause. No longer did 
prosecutors have to present their witnesses’ testimony in court, in the 
presence of the defendant, and subject to cross-examination. In other words, 
the clause ceased to be a procedural requirement (enforced by an 
“exclusionary rule”4 as necessary to preserve the integrity of the right). It 
became simply a backup to local evidence law. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. 
 1. 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965). 
 2. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
 3. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 4. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006). 
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Still, I introduce this thought exercise in order to address an important 
issue: many judges (and justices) in the post-Crawford era find it very 
difficult to believe that so many seemingly entrenched state-law and 
prosecutorial practices can be illegitimate. Judges raised under the Roberts 
approach, in other words, find it a great struggle to change their mode of 
confrontation analysis from an evidentiary approach to one that is meant to 
protect a purely procedural right. 
If the Supreme Court had gotten it right the first time, we would not 
have this problem. Law-enforcement agencies would not have developed 
prosecutorial practices—such as so-called “victimless,” or “evidence-based,” 
prosecutions—that depend on introducing statements obtained during ex 
parte interviews in lieu of live testimony. Law-enforcement agencies would 
not have created forensic evidence protocols designed to rely on affidavits 
instead of live testimony. States likely would have allocated financial 
resources toward programs aimed at producing lay and expert witnesses in 
court, instead of assuming it was unnecessary to undertake these burdens. 
And, dare I say it, law faculties would not have housed the right to 
confrontation in evidence classes and casebooks. Instead, professors likely 
would have opted to teach it in criminal procedure alongside the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the other constitutional right 
governing “witnesses” in criminal cases. 
With these real-world developments and missed opportunities in mind, 
I will try in the pages that follow to achieve two things. First, I will explain 
why, despite some continuing resistance in the judiciary and the academy, I 
firmly believe that Crawford is fundamentally sound. Second, I will map out 
a handful of things the Supreme Court could do over the next decade to 
stabilize the Crawford doctrine and to make it more easily digested and 
applied. My hope and belief is that by the time we celebrate Crawford’s 
twentieth anniversary, most lawyers and judges will thankfully engage the 
doctrine without carrying baggage from the Roberts era. By that time, 
remaining controversies should involve the edges of the doctrine, not the 
fundamentals. 
I 
The testimonial approach starts from the premise that the 
Confrontation Clause is not a rule of evidence but rather one of criminal 
procedure. As the Court explained in Crawford: 
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds 
with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to 
ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of 
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cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the 
desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little 
dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. 
Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is 
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. 
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.5 
With this insight, the Court, quite properly, decoupled the 
Confrontation Clause from hearsay law. The Confrontation Clause does not 
turn on “amorphous notions of ‘reliability,’ “ so its exclusionary rule cannot 
depend on “the vagaries of the rules of evidence.”6 In other words, the 
constitutional considerations requiring testimony to be subject to cross-
examination in criminal cases “do[] not evaporate when testimony happens 
to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception 
might be justifiable in other circumstances.”7 
All that remains from these basic principles is to determine which 
statements fall within this exclusionary rule—that is, which statements are 
“testimonial.” The Court seems to have settled on the following test: “To 
rank as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of 
‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to a later criminal 
prosecution.’ “8 By last count, eight justices endorse this general test.9 While 
some justices contend that a different test ought to apply to forensic analysts, 
 
 5. 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004). See also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 567 U.S. 305, 
319 n.6 (2009) (emphasizing that the Confrontation Clause would bar the introduction of 
forensic lab reports as a substitute for live testimony even “if all analysts always possessed the 
scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa”). 
 6. 541 U.S. at 61; see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“If there is one theme that emerges from Crawford, it is that the Confrontation Clause confers 
a powerful and fundamental right that is no longer subsumed by the evidentiary rules 
governing the admission of hearsay statements.”). 
 7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court elaborated on this 
principle while responding to the Commonwealth’s argument that forensic laboratory reports 
were admissible as business or official records: “Business and public records are generally 
admissible [in criminal cases] absent confrontation not because they qualify under an 
exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the administration of an 
entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are 
not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts’ 
statements here—prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial—were testimony against 
petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.” 567 
U.S. at 324. 
 8. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 n.6 (2011) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)); accord Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 
1143, 1154 (2011). 
 9. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154 
(new justices sign on to the opinion applying the Davis primary-purpose formulation). 
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there is no serious dispute that this “primary-purpose” test governs all 
statements made by eyewitnesses and other nonexperts. 
I don’t think this formulation is perfect, but it will suffice. The critical 
thing it does is focus a court’s attention during litigation on the 
Confrontation Clause’s core concern: whether the speaker was doing the 
functional equivalent of offering testimony. Or, put another way, it focuses 
attention on whether the jury would perceive the statement as a substitute 
for live testimony. If so, the statement is testimonial, regardless of its 
perceived reliability. 
To be sure, the Court noted in Bryant that, in determining whether a 
statement was procured “with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony[,] . . . standard rules of hearsay, designed to 
identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”10 But Justice 
Sotomayor, the author of Bryant, quickly clarified this passage. She rightly 
explained that, when a statement satisfies a hearsay exception, it is likely to 
be nontestimonial because many hearsay exceptions “rest on the belief that 
certain statements are, by their nature, made for a purpose other than use in 
a prosecution.”11 That is, some of the same things that hearsay law takes to 
indicate reliability can also indicate that a statement is nontestimonial. But 
there is no causal connection between the two—merely an overlap. The fact 
that a statement is reliable does not make it nontestimonial, for “[t]he rules 
of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause, are designed primarily to police 
reliability.”12 
One other overarching principle is important to bear in mind. Unlike 
exclusionary rules that flow from other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the 
restriction the Confrontation Clause imposes on introducing testimonial 
statements is not designed to identify or deter police misconduct. There is 
nothing unconstitutional or even improper about a police officer’s asking 
specific questions to determine what happened or executing a witness 
affidavit. To the contrary, we want the police to question witnesses and to 
conduct probing inquiries. As the Court has put it: 
Police investigations . . . are . . . in no way impugned by our 
characterization of their fruits as testimonial. Investigations of past crimes 
prevent future harms and lead to necessary arrests. While prosecutors may 
hope that inculpatory “nontestimonial” evidence is gathered, this is 
essentially beyond police control. . . . The Confrontation Clause in no way 
 
 10. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155; see also Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in part). 
 11. 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.9. 
 12. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). 
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governs police conduct, because it is the use of, not the investigatory 
collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends that provision.13 
Accordingly, courts that ask—in the face of an argument that a 
statement is testimonial—how the police should have acted differently are 
asking the wrong question. Neither the police nor any other agent of law 
enforcement has a legitimate interest in trying to obtain statements from 
witnesses that are immune from adversarial testing. Instead, investigators are 
simply supposed to try to find out what happened. Then the prosecution is 
supposed to prove its case by putting live witnesses on the stand. When the 
prosecution is unwilling or unable (through no fault of the defendant) to do 
so, the Confrontation Clause’s exclusionary rule comes into play. 
II 
Let me now outline a few things the Court should do over the next 
decade to clarify and solidify Crawford’s exclusionary rule. 
First, the Court should decide one or two cases involving statements 
made to investigators other than police officers or their immediate agents 
(such as 911 operators). The Court has held that statements to police or their 
agents in the aftermath of potentially criminal events are testimonial—at 
least once any ongoing emergency arising from the events has been 
quelled.14 But the Court has not yet addressed whether statements made 
under similar circumstances to other kinds of investigators or victim-
support organizations are testimonial. 
Most states, for example, employ personnel such as child protection 
services workers and other social workers to investigate suspected instances 
of child abuse. Most states or local law-enforcement agencies also direct (or 
at least encourage) “sexual-assault nurse examiners” or other personnel with 
medical training to conduct interviews of suspected crime victims, when 
possible, for forensic and investigatory purposes.15 Finally, many localities 
have private victims’ services organizations that interview and help identify 
victims of abuse. 
Lower courts, by and large, have held that statements made in these 
kinds of interviews are testimonial. But there are outliers in each of the three 
 
 13. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6; see also id. at 830 (noting that “the primary, if not indeed 
the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime—which is, of course, 
precisely what the officers should have done”). 
 14. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1147; Davis, 547 U.S. at 814. 
 15. As the Nevada Supreme Court put it, in reference to sexual-assault nurse examiners 
(“SANEs”), such “nurses . . . are trained to conduct sexual assault examinations. A particular 
duty of a SANE nurse is to gather evidence for possible criminal prosecution in cases of alleged 
sexual assault. SANE nurses do not provide medical treatment. They only examine the 
individual to get vital signs and a history from the victim.” Medina v. Nevada, 143 P.3d 471, 
473 (Nev. 2006). See generally United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 
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subcategories, particularly in situations in which the police are not present or 
otherwise directly involved.16 
The Supreme Court would do well to make clear that these kinds of 
statements are testimonial. All are given under investigatory circumstances. 
All are passed on directly to law enforcement insofar as they are useful to 
potential criminal prosecutions. And all, in a jury’s eyes, are a nearly perfect 
substitute for in-court testimony. The statements recount under structured 
questioning “how potentially criminal past events began and progressed.”17 
Issuing a decision holding that such statements are testimonial would 
erase any doubt about the Court’s general commitment to Crawford. It 
would also curtail the last remaining practice that law enforcement agencies 
developed to take advantage of the Roberts regime – a practice that threatens 
to allow a system in which victims and other witnesses can give their 
testimony without having to appear in court. 
The other area of current confusion, of course, involves forensic reports. 
Even though the Court has held that reports identifying a substance as an 
illegal drug or determining blood-alcohol content are testimonial, lower 
courts are divided over whether the same is true with respect to autopsy 
reports concluding that a homicide occurred.18 This should not be a difficult 
 
 16. Courts have held that statements to state social workers or child protection services 
workers during risk-assessment interviews are testimonial, regardless of whether the law-
enforcement personnel are involved in the interview or the interview is conducted at the behest 
of law enforcement. See, e.g., State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). But see 
State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 2010). If police are even indirectly involved with an 
interrogation conducted by a state social worker or child protection services worker, courts will 
likely find the statement testimonial. See, e.g., In re S.P., 215 P.3d 847 (Or. 2009). But a 
significant minority of courts treats such statements as nontestimonial when the police are not 
yet directly involved. See, e.g., Seely v. State, 282 S.W.3d 778, 789–90 (Ark. 2008). 
When private personnel interview child victims in coordination with law enforcement, courts 
have held that the resulting statements are testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 
564 (N.D. 2006). When the police are not directly involved, however, courts are divided over 
whether statements to such private personnel are testimonial. Compare D.G. v. State, 76 So. 3d 
852 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), with Bishop v. State, 982 So. 2d 371 (Miss. 2008). 
Every court but one has held that statements to sexual-assault nurse examiners and similar 
interviewers are testimonial even if the police are not yet involved. See, e.g., Medina v. State, 
143 P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006). But see State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 2006). 
 17. Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
 18. Compare United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2012) (testimonial), 
United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011), Malaska v. State, 88 A.3d 805 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2014), Commonwealth v. Carr, 986 N.E.2d 380 (Mass. 2013), State v. Navarette, 294 
P.3d 435 (N.M. 2013), Miller v. State, 313 P.3d 934 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013), Lee v. State, 418 
S.W.3d 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013), State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2014), and State v. 
Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2012), with State v. Medina, 306 P.3d 48 (Ariz. 2013) 
(nontestimonial), People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442 (Cal. 2012) (objective statements in report 
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issue, and the Court should say so by explaining that autopsy reports are 
testimonial. Just like drug and alcohol reports, autopsies indicating that 
homicide has caused death are designed to aid investigations into past 
criminal events. Autopsy reports may not target or accuse a particular 
individual of committing the crime, but neither do numerous other sorts of 
plainly testimonial statements. 
That leaves the final thing the Court should address in the near term—
the rules governing the introduction of testimonial forensic reports through 
expert witnesses. In Williams v. Illinois, five justices concluded that, when 
one expert testifies on the basis of another expert’s report, that report (or any 
statement from it that the testifying expert transmits orally) is introduced for 
the truth of the matter asserted—and thus is subject to the ordinary rules 
governing the admissibility of testimonial statements.19 This reasoning is 
manifestly correct. If the underlying report is true, it bolsters the expert’s 
opinion; if it is not, the expert’s opinion is less likely to be accurate. The 
Court should expressly endorse this principle in a majority opinion so as to 
remove any doubt that it constitutes the law. 
Furthermore, the Court should make plain that the Confrontation 
Clause prohibits a testifying expert witness from transmitting the substance 
of a nontestifying witness’s testimonial statements, even if the expert also 
offers a so-called independent opinion concerning the situation. Again, most 
courts have already recognized as much. But not all have.20 Just as with the 
“not-for-truth” argument that the state pressed in Williams, this 
independent-opinion argument would allow a bald circumvention of 
Crawford. It should therefore be walled off. 
Conclusion 
It is worth remembering that the project of developing rules of 
confrontation to apply against the states is roughly forty years behind similar 
efforts for other major criminal procedure rights. And nearly fifty years after 
the Supreme Court first coined various criminal procedure doctrines to 
implement other such rights—tests like the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” and “reasonable person would feel free to leave” formulations, 
which are used to determine when “searches” and “seizures” take place—
 
not testimonial), People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. 2012), and State v. Maxwell, 9 N.E.3d 
930 (Ohio 2014). 
 19. 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2257 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2268 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 20. Compare United States v. Soto, 720 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2013), Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 
State v. McLeod, 66 A.3d 1221 (N.H. 2013), and Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, with State v. 
Brewington, 743 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 2013) (ignoring in-court witness’s disclosure of testimonial 
statements because the witness offered “independent opinion”), and Lui, 315 P.3d 493 
(testifying expert may transmit any noninculpatory statement from nontestifying analyst). 
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courts still struggle at the margins to apply those tests. This is because 
doctrines designed to translate ancient (or at least colonial-era) protections 
to modern circumstances cannot eliminate all hard cases. Rather, the most 
we can hope for is that such doctrines will allow courts to get the easy cases 
right and force courts to ask the right questions when considering the hard 
cases. 
Crawford is well on its way to accomplishing that objective. (No one, for 
example, argues anymore about whether nontestifying witnesses’ custodial 
confessions or grand-jury testimonies are admissible.) But we’re not quite 
there yet. Hopefully in another ten years we will be. 
 
